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Yasukuni as War Memorial
Joseph Phillips
In trodu.e ti on
Founded in the year followlngthe Meiji Restoration, Yasukuni Shrine
in Tokyo's Chiyoda Ward has come to symbolize fわr many both what
is right and what is wrong about Japan's vision of its place in the
world. This has lead inevitably to the politicization of many aspects of
the shrine and practices that relate to it. Most familiar of these are
the visits to the shrine of Japanese Prime Ministers and the enshrine-
ment or war-dead, including convicted war criminals. These issues
engender strong reaction from far and wide.
While nominally a shrine, Yasukunifunctions more as a war memo-
rial, and focuslng On this, I will contrast its history and function with
those or war memorials in other countries. More specifically, I will ex-
plorethese questions:What isthe main function of a war memorial?
Is Yasukuni functionally distinct from war memorials in other coun-
tries?What does it share, and what distinguishes it from, for exam-
ple, Arlington National Cemetery, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, or
the Cenotaph in London? Can we make a meaningful distinction be-
tween war graves in Flanders and Yasukuni? And where, among all
these questions, dothe feelings of the relatives of the fallen come in?
Finally, can a religious institution, namely a shrine, be separated
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from a war memorial when both exist in the same physical space?
Befわre considering the situation as it pertains to Yasukuni, We must
consider what indeed a war memorial is, and this requlreS SOme COn-
sideration of the history of war memorials and indeed, the history or
modern warfare itself.
War Memorials: A Brief History
ln a sense, war memorials have existed fわr thousands of years. Egyp-
tian pharaohs and ancient Greeks built obelisks and columns to com-
memorate military victories. Trajan's column in Romeglorifiesthat
emperor's victories in Romanla, and Mayan stelae in Palenque and Ti-
kal celebrate victories in long-forgotten wars. Statues of kings, gener-
als and emperors are war memorials of sorts, but they celebrate the
individual or the battle rather than all the soldiers who gave their
lives. Most of them might better be described as monuments rather
1)
than memorials. According to Mosse, the modern concept of the war
memorial began with the French Revolution, wherein fわr the first
time, armies consisted of significant numbers of volunteers. Prior to
that time, armies were largely comprised of mercenaries, vassals, or
conscripts press-ganged into service. Withvolunteer armies came the
idea of fighting for a nation rather than for an individual ruler or for
money, and out of respect fわr this idealism came the sense of obliga-
tion to those who had fallen in battle. Out of this sense of obligation,
and perhaps also out of a sense of shame in fbllowlng the tradition of
letting dogs and vultures deal withthe remains of the fallen, the mili-
tary cemetery came into being.
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Mosse traces the development of cemeteries and memorials through
the 19th century cE, and while trends and styles are expressed in dif-
ferent ways in different countries, that need not concern us here.
What is important isthat there seemed to be a universal response to-
ョ)
ward the commemoration of war dead across Europe. According to
Mosse, nations create a generic fictional account of wars in order to
mask the unacceptable horror of accurate recollection. He sees the
First World War as being instrumental in amplifying this fiction to
mythic proportions.
From its beginnlng in the summer of 1914 to the armistice in Novem-
ber of 1918, 8,500,000 soldiers died. This was more than the aggre一
gate combat deaths in all previous major wars back as far as the Na-
poleonic Wars. In France alone, 1,300,000 are estimated to have died.
To put this number in perspective, an average of more than 850
French soldiers died each day of the conflict. This is almost three
times the rate of US combat deaths in World War H. The scale of
death meant that the number of bereaved was enormous. Almost
every family had lost a father, son, husband, brother, or friend. Con-
comitant with overwhelming grief was perhaps a natural questionlng
of the justification of the war and its motivation. Indeed, perhaps
there also existed a doubt about the viability of the nation state itself.
The scale of death and destruction on all sides was horrendous, but
perhaps these doubts were particularly acute in the defeated nations.
How is a nation to deal with this grief and selトdoubt? According to
Mosse, war memorials became ubiquitous features across Europe in
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the propagation of `the Myth of the War Experience.'Memorials and
cemeteries helped to enfわrce a collective memory of the war, which in
turn provided social cohesion. The grief of individual families was
transformed into the grief of the nation. Did the grief drivethe myth,
Or was the myth instrumental in directing and controlling the grief?
Mosse would suggest the latter; for as Connerton points out, the crea-
tion of a collective national memory lS aS much a political process as a
3)
social one.
How was this myth created? First, there was the scale of memorial
and cemetery construction. Memorials were built in most communi-
ties, even in small villages, and the sheer area occupied by military
cemeteries had never been seen before. Second, in a break from previ-
ous practice, the names of individual soldiers -all of those who could
be identified- were inscribed on memorials and grave crosses, and re-
corded in honor-rolls. Until this war, individual soldiers had only
been commemorated in this way f♭r valor or some other exceptional
conduct, but now, participation alone guaranteed commemoration.
However, this new individuality in death was diminished and the
community of the dead emphasized by an overwhelming unifわrmity in
the style of inscription. On any particular memorial, names were in-
scribed in small letters of unifわrm height regardless of rank. Row
upon row of identical white crosses were laid out in military cemeter-
ies; agaln, Small in scale and simple. There was a democratization in
deaththat supported the idea that the family's loss was indeed the
nation-family's loss. Perhaps the most obvious examples of this no-
tion were the tombs of unknown soldiers that appeared at this time.
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The very lack of an identity allowed all to claim the unknown soldier
as a brother, son, or husband. As Clark states, war memorials are a
′1)
way of nationalizing very personal forms of grief.
Essential to the `Myth of the War experience,'in Mosse's analysis is
something he refers to as 'the Cult of the Fallen Soldier.'The soldier
is portrayed as a heroic figure often expressed in classical form and
accompanied witha religious motif such as a crucifix or pieta, Or the
fallen soldier in the arms of Christ. By controlling the images associ-
ated with war, governments can influence the way ln Which wars are
remembered. This is important, not only fわr the reasons or social cohe-
sion mentioned above, but also because the nation must make the sac-
.r-))
rifice meaningful. Implicit inthis, of course, is the notion that the sac-
rifice might be requested again. Barthel describesthis as a pact bel
6)
tween the dead, the living, and the unborn.
It appears then that a war memorial has two main functions. The
first is to act as a focus for the expression of personal and collective
grief. The second is as a device for deflecting grief, anger, or other
negative (from a nationalist point of view) emotions and transforming
them into a memory of war experience that supports a nationalistic
ideology.
Yasukuni: The First ModernWar Memorial
Yasukuni shares many of the above functions, and its broad mecha-
nism for implementing them is similar in many respects tothe war
memorials that appeared in Europe fわllowing World War I. First,
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Yasukuni is constructed on an eplC scale: it sits on top of Kudan hill,
close to the Imperial Palace, Occupying a large area in central Tokyo.
The approach to the shrine is throughthe largest torii in the country.
Second, the equality and unifわrmity in death is maintained. There are
no statues to heroes at Yasukuni. Similar to the row upon row of sim-
ple grave markers in European military cemeteries, names of the
dead are recorded on simple lists. Furthermore, a certain anonymity
is maintained through the sheer number of them. Ceremony and pag-
eantry also find points in common between European war memorials
and Yasukuni. Armistice Day, November ll, marks the day on which
veterans, politicians, and other mourners visit war memorials in
Europe and its fわrmer colonies. August 15 has the same slgnificance
in Japan. Finally, in the same way that large war memorials such as
the cenotaph in London are duplicated in miniature in tens of thou-
sands of villages throughout Europe, Yasukuni is mirrored by amiate
Defense of the Nation Shrines at the prefectural level, and chukonhi
7)
stone markers, at the local level in Japan.
h certain ways Yasukuni appears to be an extreme example of
Mosse's myth. Whereas in Europe the myth appears to have emerged
in full following, and in response to, the First World War; in Japan, it
seems to have been an instrument of Meiji ideology from the first.
The myth was invigorated perhaps by the Russo-Japanese war, in
which more than 80,000 Japanese died, and by the end of the Pacific
War, it had become a central feature of propaganda designed to main-
tain morale inthe face of defeat. In the case of Europe, it is difrlCult
to say whether or not the Myth of the War Experience was a willful
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exercise in propaganda from the first, Or an example of governments
taking advantage of a phenomenon that arose naturally and spontane-
ously out of a massive outpouring of public grief. Quite probably, ele一
ments of both explanations are valid. In Japan, by contrast, it seems
that the Myth of the War Experience was deliberately created, main-
tained, and promoted by the authorities.
War Memorials and Historiography
Since the Second World War, war memorials have increaslngly begun
to augment the traditional functions discussed above with attempts at
direct and overt expressions of what constitutes official history. These
expressions are most commonly seen in the fわrm or a museum at-
tached to the memorial. The orlglnS Of these museums are often ex-
plained in terms of the wishes of soldiers. The Omcial Australian War
Historian of the First World War, Charles Bean, feltthatthe inclu-
sion of a collection of relics was important to the understanding of
wartime experience:
It had always been in the mind of many Australians soldiers that
records and relics of'their fighting would be preserL･ed in soTne in-
stitutions in Australia, and to several of us it had seeTned that a
museum housing these would form the TnOSt natural, interesting,
H)
and inspiring TnemOrial to those who fell.
The selection and presentation of such relics in museums, whether at-
tached to war memorials or not, is an unavoidably political act, the
exercise of which contributes to a particular view of history. That such
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selection and presentation can cause controversy is hardly surpnslng.
A notable example is the controversy surrounding the exhibition of
the Enola Gay at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington
DC in 1995. The initial exhibition was to have featured a comprehen-
sive view of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Au-
gust or 1945. 1t would have portrayed the experience of Japanese vic-
tims of the bombing as well as the technical achievements and fur-
therance of Japan's rapid capitulation. Groups of US veterans and
their relatives objected to the inclusion of a Japanese point of view as
a distraction and insult to those US fわrces members who had taken
part. In the end, the exhibit was reduced in scope and the fuselage of
the Enola Gay exhibited essentially without historical comment: a
(J)
victory of commemoration over history.
Yasukuni and its attached museum, Yushukan, leave no ambiguity
about which version or history they wish to portray. The fbllowlng
passage from Yasukuni's website sums up its political stance quite
clearly:
War is truly sorrowfu. Yet to maintain the independence and
peace of the nation and for the prosperity of all of Asia, Japan was
forced into conflict. The precious lives that were lost in these inci-
dents and wars are worshiped as the Kami (Deities) of'Yasukuni
Jinja.
Allow me to say a little about the Greater East Asian War that
ended 50 years ago. When the American forces inL,aded Okinawa
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they u)ere Tnet by soldiers of- Japan, among wholn Were also inter-
mediate school students. To protect their native Okinau)a some
1,600 Tnale intermediate school students fought side by side with
soldiers oF Japan as the Tekketsu KinTW Tat. They came from 9
schools in Okinawa that included the Okinawa Normal School,
the First Prefectural InteT･mediate School and the Second Prefec-
tural InterTnediate School.
In addition, the HiTneyuT･i Butai and the ShirauTne Butai com-
posed of soTne 460 female students coming froTn Seven SChools in-
cluding the First Prerectural WoTnen's High School, Second Prefec-
tuT･al Women's High School, and Shuri Women's High School.
These students served as nurses at the front lines. They moved
through the battlefields carTTing food and ammunition. Nearly all
these students perished in the Battle of Okinawa. Now resting in
peace, they are enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja.
Some 1,500 peoples lost their lives when the Tsushima Maru, a
transport ship, was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine
while transporting evacuees from Okinawa to Kagoshima. In-
cluded among them were 700 elemeTuaTT SChool students.
There were also a large number of students who had lost their
lives in air raids on the factories that they worked in. Due to the
war, these students postponed their studies to help with manufac-
tunng work.
On August 20, 1945, despite the end of the war, Soviet troops sud-
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denly iTWaded the terT･itory oF Japan. Under siege, a female tele-
phone operator in Maoka of Karafuto (Sakhalin) ended her report:
"EueTyOne, this is our last and final transmission. Goodbye to you
all." Shortly thereafter the feTnale operatoT･S took their own lives.
ATnOng the Kami of'Yasukuni Jinja are military nurses who in
their Red Cross insignia uniforms worked gallantly in the face of
air raids on the homeland to save the wounded. They were "the
mothers and sisters of the battlef言eld." In addition, the workers on
the militaTT transport Ships who perished as their ships carTyIng
supplies to the South Pacific were sent to the bottom of the seas,
the military correspondents and cameramen Felled by enemy fire
while working at the front-they are noble souls who offbred their
liues For their motherland. They are revered as the KaTni of
Yasukuni Jinja.
Moreover, there were those who gave up their lives after the end of
the Great East Asian War, taking upon themselves the responsibil-
ity for the war. There were also 1,068 "Martyrs of- Showa" who
were cruelly and uTU'ustly tried as war criminals by a sham-like
tribunal of the Allied forces (United States, England, the Nether-
lands, China and others). These martyrs are also the Kami of
lし))
Yasukuni Jinja.
Apart from the references to the vulnerable: students,girls, evacuees,
telephone operators, mothers , sisters , correspondents and photogra-
phers; and apart from the noble acts: nursing, Carrylng food, even
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suicide; this reference is notable for what is not mentioned: slave la-
bor, comfort women, chemical and biological experiments on humans,
and genocide. It is difrlCult to viewthis as anything but theglorifica-
tion orwar.
tl)
The essential thesis in Fallen Soldiers is that the commemoration of
the fallenthroughrites and ceremonies on certain special anniversa-
ries amounts to a secular religion that at the least transfわrms and
ameliorates the collective memory of the ho汀Or Of war and potentially
glorifies it. Taking on the attributes of a religion means that history
becomes a matter of doctrine and faith and is insulated from doubt
and inspection. Commemoration as religious practice is particularly
significant in Japan when commemoration itself takes place in a relig-
ious context一mamely a shrine.
The commemoration also becomes problematic in Japan's case in view
of its surrender and the subsequent trial and conviction of political
and military leaders fわr war crimes. In 1978, 14 class A war crimi-
nals, including the executed wartime leader Tqjo Hideki, were en-
shrined at Yasukuni. How is it possible to transfわrm such commemo-
ration into something that speaks positively to Japan's past? The con-
ventional view of history a氏er all is that of the victors; the leadership
of Japan was taken over by a small unrepresentative group of milita-
rists, who then led the country ln perpetrating an aggressive war
upon its neighbors, which led to untold suffering at home. In recent
years however there has been an increasingly visible shi氏in the in-
terpretation of these 'historical facts.'One way that Yasukuni and the
286
attached Yushukan attempt this is to classify the Tokyo War Crimes
Trials as nothing more than victor's justice. This reinterpretation sug-
geststhat Yasukuni is performing a Secular rather than religious
function.
Con(!lusion
Yasukuni Shrine andthe attached Yushukan demonstrate many par-
allels with European war memorials. Moreover, Yasukuni predates
the modern European war memorial by 50 years. Yasukuni of course
also functions as a shrine, butthis function would appear to be secon-
dary, or more cynlCally, a way to cloak and protect its political func-
tion. Yasukuni is conveniently a private religious institution, thus en-
gendering two advantages: first, as a religious institution, it is pro-
tected by Article 20 0f the Japanese Constitution; second, as a private
institution, the government has no power to dictate to the shrine.
Thus, Yasukuni's private religious status suggeststhat it is unlikely
to be replaced as Japan's de facto main war memorial by Chidoriga-
fuchi or other secular memorial.
Notes
1) Mosse (1990, 15-19)
2 ) I was tempted to write Europe and North America. While Mosse does touch
on memorials inthe USA, in particular with reference tothe Park Cemetery
movement, his book is overwhelmingly Eurocentric, with its fbcus丘rmly
丘Ⅹed on Germany and France.
3) Connerton (1989, 1)
4) Clark (1997, 118)
5 ) It is interesting to consider this control of the imagery of war by government.
One reason fわr the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the rise of the at-
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tendant anti-war movement was the graphic and sometimes horrific images
of that war that were wildly published. Contrast that with the control over
the images from the current US action in Iraq, where initially, only embed-
ded journalists were able to accompany the military, and where images of
coffins and body bags have been strictly censored.
6) Barthel (1996, 80)
7) Field (1991, 120)
8) Bean (1948, 5)
9) HoganM. (1996, 200-32)
10) http: 〟www.yasukuni.orjp/english/
ll) Mosse (1990)
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